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Abstract 
Both theoretical predictions of Keynesian view and a large body of empirical studies on 
developed countries suggest that business cycle fluctuations can be partially smoothed by 
counter-cyclical fiscal policies. Our paper extends this strand of literature by considering the 
nexus between output fluctuations and government size in the context of Chinese fiscal 
federalism. Using a sample of 29 Chinese provinces for the period of 1994-2007, we fail to 
provide consistent evidence for the stabilizing effect of fiscal policies. In particular, we find 
that under the tax assignment system (fen shui zhi), neither the central government’s fiscal 
transfers nor the provincial budgetary and extra-budgetary revenues help reduce economic 
volatility. Such results are shown to be robust across different model specifications, volatility 
measures and estimation techniques.  
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1. Introduction 
Plainly, the ongoing financial crisis has offered useful lessons for the role of government 
spending and taxes in the macroeconomic stabilization. Traditional Keynesian view suggests 
that business cycle fluctuations can be partially smoothed by counter-cyclical fiscal policies, 
which work through automatic stabilizers and discretionary actions. Empirically, this 
proposition implies that there should be a negative statistical association between government 
size and economic volatility, for which a number of authors provided supportive evidence 
from the data of developed countries, such as Galí (1994), van den Noord (2000), Fatás and 
Mihov (2001), Andrés, Doménech and Fatás (2008) and Debrun, Pisani-Ferry and Sapir 
(2008). Nonetheless, significantly less attention has devoted to the stabilizing effect of 
governments in the case of developing countries. Such a paucity of studies is somewhat 
surprising in view of the fact that with vulnerable structure of production and underdeveloped 
social security system, developing countries are generally subject to more sharp and painful 
economic fluctuations.  
Our study extends this strand of literature by considering the experience of China, which 
is not only the biggest developing economy, but has also engaged in market-oriented reforms 
since the late 1970s. The style of China is of paramount interest at least, for three major 
reasons. First, it is well known that in launching various political movements, such as Great 
Leap Forward (1958-1960) and Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the Chinese government 
had played a role as an ‘engine’, rather than a ‘stabilizer’ of sharp economic fluctuations 
experienced over Mao era. Thus, it seems natural to ask to what extent such a role has been 
altered as the reforms proceed. Does the empirical regularity that government spending and 
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taxes help reduce output volatility hold in the case of China today?  
Second, even during the post-Mao era, the path of China’s rapid emergence is by no 
means a smooth one. Substantial boom/slump fluctuations in aggregate economic activity 
could be observed over the three past decades, which were often associated with the retreat 
and revival of determination to reform (Qian and Weingast 1996, Qian 2000, and Lin, Cai and 
Li 2003). Accordingly, a concern facing Chinese policymakers emerges: how to balance the 
dynamics of output growth against macroeconomic stability? It appears to be a critical 
politico-economic issue for which Chinese leadership was less concerned before. 
Third, perhaps more interestingly, over the transition period the central- provincial fiscal 
relationships in China have witnessed dramatic changes due to various decentralized 
arrangements, especially the revenue-sharing reform over the 1980s and tax assignment 
reform in 1994 (fen shui zhi). As a matter of fact, China’s current fiscal system has features 
corresponding to fiscal federalism, which creates strong incentives for local political 
authorities to promote the economic growth in their own jurisdictions. However, the division 
of taxing powers and expenditure responsibilities in a decentralized fashion also triggers 
marked divergence in macroeconomic objectives between local and central political powers. 
Indeed, it is widely believed that in seeking eagerly high growth rates, local authorities, which 
usually see the macroeconomic stability as a public good best left to others, are primarily 
responsible for cyclical pattern of China’s growth (Yang 2004). Thus, an important question 
arises: Do the fiscal policies adopted by different levels of government have consistent 
stabilizing effects on business cycles?   
To shed light on these major concerns, the current paper attempts to quantitatively 
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investigate the nexus between output fluctuations and government size for Chinese provinces 
(or province-level regions). To the best of our knowledge, there have been very few empirical 
studies addressing this issue at sub-national level, with a notable exception of Fatás and 
Mihov (2001), which show supportive evidence for the stabilizing role of fiscal policies 
across US states. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section summarizes main 
features of government size and central-provincial fiscal arrangements in China. Section 3 
outlines national and provincial trends in output volatility. The path of China’s economic 
expansion is also compared with those of a large range of countries. Section 4 provides an 
econometric investigation on the effects of fiscal policies adopted by central and provincial 
governments on business cycle fluctuations. Different measures of output volatility and 
government size, control variables, model specifications and estimation techniques are 
considered to check the robustness of results. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Government Size and Fiscal Arrangements in China 
Given the fact that China’s fiscal reforms in the post-Mao era have been discussed in 
great depth by a number of studies, such as Ma and Norregaard (1998), Zhang(1999), Wei 
(2000), Wang and Hu (2001), and Zhang and Gong (2005), we do not intend to add a 
comprehensive presentation on this issue. For our purposes, we focus however on some 
general trends in ‘government size’, as well as the central-provincial fiscal arrangements 
around the 1994 tax assignment reform. Such a description, albeit partial, seems helpful to 
understand our further empirical analysis.  
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First, China witnessed a steady decline in government size relative to GDP expansion 
during 1978-1994. As shown in Figure 1, both the total (center plus provinces) government 
budgetary revenue and provincial counterparts had shrunk substantially compared to GDP 
over that period. The relative size of central government also followed a falling trend after the 
redesigning of fiscal contract system in 1984. Indeed, this phenomenon, referred to as ‘decline 
of state capacity’ by Wang and Hu (2001), consists of a strong motivation for implementing 
the tax assignment reform in 1994. Clearly, as can be seen from the figure, since the inception 
of 1994 reform, the government size relative to GDP, judged both from central budget and 
provincial budget, has not only stopped to decline, but also risen through time. 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
Second, regarding the center-province relationship, the provincial fiscal powers were 
greatly weakened owing to the reform. As illustrated in Figure 2, the share of provincial 
budgetary revenue in total budgetary revenue has declined sharply from 78% in 1993 to 44% 
in 1994 and since then remains relatively stable over the following years. Meanwhile, the 
share of provincial budgetary expenditure has not been directly affected by the tax assignment. 
By contrast, it appears to rise gradually during the three past decades. 
[Figure 2 around here] 
 
Third, as a consequence of the 1994 reform, the dramatic changes in central-provincial 
fiscal status lead to a marked imbalance of provincial budget. To finance widened deficits, 
provinces depend almost entirely upon the fiscal transfers from the center. In Figure 3 we set 
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out the major trends in fiscal transfers over the period of 1990-2007, for which the data are 
available. As displayed in the figure, the net central transfers, which refer to the transfers 
(grants) less remittances, have come to play an important role both in provincial budget and 
national economy. On average, the net transfers account for 41% of provincial budgetary 
expenditure, and 5% of provincial GDP over 1994-2007.  
[Figure 3 around here] 
 
Finally, prior to the 1994 tax assignment, the extra-budgetary funds1, which refer to the 
funds without being included in the official budget, had already exhibited some important 
rearrangements in 1993. As illustrated in Figure 4, the extra-budgetary revenue and 
expenditure declined sharply compared to GDP in 1993. This dramatic change is due mainly 
to the fact that the revenue collected from state-owned enterprises, which was the primary 
source of extra-budgetary revenue before the reform (accounting for around 75% of the total 
extra-budgetary revenue), has been included in the formal budget since 1993. In addition, as 
shown in the figure, the fall in relative size of extra-budgetary funds managed by center is 
much more pronounced than the fall in those managed by provinces. Consequently, the ratio 
of central budgetary funds relative to GDP has been virtually negligible since 1993, whereas 
the provincial counterparts remain a non-trivial portion of GDP (around 3%) and thus, their 
role in local economic activity seems worth investigating.   
[Figure 4 around here] 
 
3. Output Growth Volatility 
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Although during the era of market-oriented reform China has yet to experience a typical 
business cycle according to the definition of NBER, the path of its economic emergence is by 
no means a smooth one. Indeed, the fluctuations of China’s output around its long term trend 
have come to attract considerable scholarly interest, such as Imai (1996), Oppers(1997), 
Brandt and Zhu(2000), Zhang and Wan(2005), Gong and Lin (2008), and Laurenceson and 
Dobson (2008). In Figure 5, we show the annual growth rates of China’s real GDP, its 
deviation from the period average, as well as the output gap calculated from the widely used 
Hodrick-Prescott filter (see Data appendix for details on its calculation). In spite of the 
absence of a proper ‘contraction’ characterized as a period of negative growth, a marked 
cyclical pattern of GDP expansion can be readily observed.  
[Figure 5 around here] 
 
In addition, business cycle fluctuations in China declined through time. For our purposes, 
Table 1 describes the GDP growth path of Chinese provinces during the pre- and post-1994 
tax reform periods. If we look at the coefficient of variation, which is defined as the ratio of 
standard deviation to mean, such a falling trend in volatility is quite significant. Indeed, all 
Chinese provinces exhibited larger variability of growth rates over the first period than the 
second. Similar results can also be obtained by using the standard deviation of output gap as 
an alternative measure of volatility (not reported), with only two exceptions: Guangdong and 
Neimeng2.  
[Table 1 around here] 
 
 9 
Apparently, this phenomenon is due mainly to China’s transition program. As argued 
some authors, such as Brandt and Zhu (2000), and Laurenceson and Dobson (2008), the high 
volatility in real output, along with serious inflation in the early stage of the reform can be 
explained by combined effects of the dual-track price system, decentralization of 
decision-making authority, and the restructuring of the state sector. Because these factors had 
either dissipated or substantially changed by the early 1990s, Chinese economy has become 
less volatile since then. Moreover, the political crisis in 1989 that had people doubt the 
orientation of the reform is another important source of shock. As shown in Table 1, the year 
of 1989 was followed by spectacular slowdown in economic growth. As a matter of fact, 
China recorded the two lowest GDP growth rates in 1989 and 1990 over the post-1978 period, 
namely 4.2% and 4.1%, respectively. They are vastly inferior to the three-decade average: 
9.88%. 
As a final step, we compare the cyclical fluctuations of Chinese economy with those of a 
broad range of countries. Table 2 shows the average growth rates of real GDP and their 
variability measure for major developed and developing economies around the world, as well 
as some aggregates of countries over the period of China’s reform: 1978-2007. Clearly, 
although the economic fluctuations are generally sharper in developing countries than 
developed countries, China is an important exception. It has not only marked the most rapid 
economic growth rates among selected countries, but stood out in terms of the smoothness of 
growth path as well. Such an extraordinary stability of Chinese economy compared to 
international experience appears to be a puzzle (Laurenceson and Dobson 2008) and in 
particular, the role of China’s fiscal policies that most Keynesian economists consider vital to 
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dampening economic fluctuations is still unclear.  
[Table 2 around here] 
 
4. Econometric Issues 
4.1. Cross Section Analysis 
Our empirical analysis relies on a sample of 29 provinces of mainland China over the 
years of 1994-20073, namely the period under the aforementioned fen shui zhi system. 
Focusing on this period is owing mainly to the data availability. In addition, it seems 
noteworthy that according to Qian (2000), China has also reached the second stage of China’s 
reform since 1994, which is explicitly oriented toward a ‘socialist market system’.  
As a first step, the regressions are conducted in a cross-section framework. The generic 
form of empirical model can be expressed as follows: 
0 1  ,  1...29 (province).i iOutput volatility government size iβ β= + ⋅ =     
Following most existing studies, such as Galí (1994) and Fatás and Mihov (2001), the 
benchmark specification is to regress the standard deviation of provincial real GDP growth 
(sd_growth) on the logarithm of average ratio of provincial government expenditure 
(budgetary plus extra-budgetary) to GDP over the period of 1994-2007, denoted as 
Exp_94074.  
The regression is carried out by means of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) procedure, 
adjusting standard errors for the presence of heteroskedasticity5. The results are reported in 
the column (1) of Table 3. As predicted Keynesian statement, the coefficient of government 
size is negative and significant at 10% level. But the R-squared, 0.0609, is much smaller than 
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the range of 0.2 to 0.4, which are typically obtained in the related studies (for example Galí 
1994, and Fatás and Mihov 2001).   
[Table 3 around here] 
Next, given the current fiscal arrangements in China, it is tempting to discern the 
stabilizing role of different levels of government. As discussed previously, after the fiscal 
reform of 1994, the consolidated provincial expenditure is principally financed out of three 
non-trivial parts: provincial budgetary revenue, extra-budgetary revenue and net transfers 
received from the center. Apparently, these funds may not have the same effects on output 
stabilization. In particular, there is no unequivocal answer to the question whether Chinese 
provincial and central authorities have consistent attitude toward the balance between the 
rapidity and stability of economic growth6. To address this concern, we introduce all these 
spending items simultaneously into the model as distinct government size measures. Similarly, 
they are expressed as the logarithms of average ratios to provincial GDP, denoted as 
Rev_b_9407, Rev_e_9407 and Transfer_9407. We also conduct the variance inflation factor 
(vif) analysis, which suggests that there is no severe multicollinearity among the three 
variables.  
As can be seen from the column (2) of Table 3, despite the negative signs, the three 
government size measures are not only individually insignificant by t test, but also jointly 
insignificant by F test at conventional level.  
Nonetheless, the parsimonious specification may suffer from bias due to omission of 
relevant variables. To deal with this problem, four determinants of economic volatility are 
included as controls. The first variable is the degree of economic openness of a province 
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vis-à-vis the rest of the world. As documented in Rodrik (1998), more open economies tend to 
be more volatile because of the exposure to external risk. In this study, the sum of imports and 
exports scaled by GDP (Openness_9407) is used as a measure of openness. The second one is 
related to the financial development. It is generally recognized that the financial 
intermediation is one of primary substitutes for fiscal stabilization (see Debrun, Pisani-Ferry 
and Sapir 2008). Here, the share of value-added of financial sector in GDP (Fin_dev_9407) is 
used as a proxy of the degree of financial development. The third one is a standard indicator 
of production concentration: Krugman specialization index (Spec_9407)7. In theory, the more 
concentrated (or specialized) the production of a region, the more volatile the regional 
economy owing to industry-specific shocks. The last control is the growth rate 
(Growth_9407). As discussed in Fatás and Mihov (2001), economies with smaller 
governments might grow faster, whereas higher rates of growth are often associated to more 
volatile growth path. Finally, note that in the framework of cross section analysis, all these 
control variables are expressed as the period average over 1994-2007. 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 contain the results from this augmented specification. 
Although the fitness of the model is substantially improved (with R-Squared rising from 0.06 
to 0.63), and most controls enter the procedure significantly with expected signs, it turns out 
that both the consolidated and decomposed government expenditures are insignificantly 
associated with economic volatility8.  
In the following, we turn to the possible endogeneity issue. It is argued that if fiscal 
policies help stabilize output fluctuations, volatile economies are likely to opt for large 
governments (Rodrik 1998). From an econometric viewpoint, there appears to be a reverse 
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causality between independent variable and dependent variable, which might yield biased 
OLS estimates. To tackle this problem, we focus on the decomposed expenditure model9 and 
instrument Rev_b_9407, Rev_e_9407 and Transfer_9407 by the period average of 
urbanisation rate, dependency ratio, logarithms of real GDP and real GDP per capita (in 1978 
price), which are standard determinants of government size and commonly used in that 
context (see Fatás and Mihov 2001, and Debrun, Pisani-Ferry and Sapir 2008)10. As shown in 
Column (5) of Table 3, while the associated P-value of Sargan test suggests that the 
hypothesis of exogeneity of instruments cannot be rejected at conventional level, the IV 
estimates of government size are still insignificant. 
Next, to accommodate the transitional dynamics of economic growth, we use the 
standard deviation of aforementioned output gap as an alternative volatility indicator11. As 
shown in columns (6) and (7) of Table 3, our main findings on government size coefficients 
do not change significantly.  
Finally, as Fatás and Mihov (2001) point out, traditional Keynesian view emphasizes 
merely the smoothing role of fiscal policies on disposable income and private consumption 
without making clear predictions about the effects on the volatility of aggregate GDP, which 
contains the government spending. In the light of this contention, the last two columns of 
Table 3 reproduce OLS regressions with two alternative measures of private output volatility: 
standard deviation of personal income growth (sd_in), and standard deviation of household 
consumption growth (sd_con)12. As before, all the three government size variables remain 
statistically insignificant, with an exception for the estimate of budgetary revenue-to-GDP 
ratio shown in Column (9), which is significant at 10 % level but with a positive sign, 
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indicating that the larger provincial budgetary revenue size, the more volatile the household 
consumption.      
 
4.2. Panel Analysis 
To check further the robustness of our findings, we next explore the link between 
government size and business cycles in a panel framework. It is argued that the panel 
approach allows controlling for the unobserved individual (here, provincial) heterogeneity. At 
this juncture, it seems noteworthy that at least two significant determinants of output volatility, 
geography and institutional quality, which are recently documented by Malik and Temple 
(2009), have not been explicitly observed in this study but, can be viewed as provincial 
specific characters. From an econometric viewpoint, omitting these provincial heterogeneous 
factors, the preceding cross section analysis may lead to biased estimates.   
We first divide the entire sample into three sub-periods: 1994-1998, 1999-2003 and 
2004-200713. Then, as a starting point, the standard deviation of the rate of GDP growth over 
each sub-period is regressed on the government size measures and a set of controls averaged 
over each sub-period. Moreover, to deal with nationwide common effect (for example an 
exchange rate adjustment), two period dummies for years of 1999-2003 and 2004-2007 are 
included in the analysis.    
The regression results are shown in Column 1 of Table 4. According to the 
Breusch-Pagan (Breusch and Pagan 1980) test which suggests the existence of significant 
provincial effects, and the Hausman test which suggests the uncorrelation between provincial 
unobserved effects and other explanatory variables, the random-effects estimator is preferred 
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to pooled OLS and fixed-effects estimator. Despite the good fit of the model, the government 
size coefficients are still statistically indifferent from zero.  
[Table 4 around here] 
 
To check the sensitivity of these results, we also run the regressions with alternative 
volatility indicators. As can be seen from columns (2)-(5) of Table 4, relying on estimators 
chosen out of Breusch-Pagan test and Hausman test, our main findings on insignificance of 
government size measures remain robust, with an exception of the significant coefficient of 
extra-budgetary revenue-to-GDP ratio in income volatility model14. The associated sign is, 
however, positive, indicating destabilizing effect of provincial extra-budgetary revenue on 
private income smoothing.      
 
5. Conclusions 
Both theoretical predictions of Keynesian view and a large body of empirical studies on 
developed countries suggest that business cycle fluctuations can be partially smoothed by 
counter-cyclical fiscal policies, which work through automatic stabilizers and discretionary 
actions. Our paper extends this strand of literature by considering the nexus between output 
fluctuations and government size in the context of Chinese fiscal federalism. Using a sample 
of 29 Chinese provinces for the period of 1994-2007, we fail to provide consistent evidence 
for the stabilizing effect of fiscal policies. In particular, we find that under the tax assignment 
system, neither the central government’s fiscal transfers nor the provincial budgetary and 
extra-budgetary revenues help moderate output volatility. It implies that in sharp contrast with 
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the experiences of most developed countries, China’s central and provincial authorities have 
not used public spending as a main policy tool for dampening economic shocks. Such results 
are shown to be robust across different model specifications, volatility measures and 
estimation techniques.  
Eventually, we ought to note that the behavior of China’s government toward 
fluctuations has substantially changed in the wake of the current economic crisis. At the time 
of writing (May 2010), it seems that the aggressive programs of economic stimulus adopted 
by China’s central and local governments have achieved good outcomes: China weathered the 
global recession better than many other countries, and according to preliminary data released 
by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the annual growth target for 2009, 8%, has been 
even overfulfilled to 8.7%. However, one may reasonably speculate that our findings based on 
the experience of the pre-crisis period are helpful to understand the current situation: the 
absence of fiscal stabilizing mechanism over the preceding years made the speed and the 
depth of China’s response to the first wave of global financial tsunami unanticipated. 
Consequently, these unprecedented discretionary actions unleashed immediate and powerful 
stimulus to the sentiment of investors and consumers. In addition, as points out Naughton 
(2009a, 2009b), besides Keynesian initiatives, China’s successful handling of the crisis is also 
attributed to the old-fashioned government planning. The latter contains credit plans, 
industrial policy, even media control and mobilisation through the Communist Party. Arguably, 
these measures, which are obviously unusual for a mature market economy, might also 
contribute to the extraordinary stability of China’s growth path during the past decades. 
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Data Appendix 
Consumer Price Index (CPI). Data come from China Statistical Yearbook, various 
issues.. 
Dependency ratio. It is defined as the ratio of non-working-age population (aged 0-14 
as well as 65 and over) to the working-age population (aged 15- 64). The data come from 
China Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
GDP, GDP growth rates, GDP per capita, value-added of financial sector and 
household consumption. All data come from China Statistical Yearbook (for years of 
2005-2007), and Data of Gross Domestic Product of China: 1952-2004 (for years of 
1994-2004). The latter reports the revised data from the First National Economic Census 
conducted in 2004. 
Foreign trade. The variable refers to the value of provincial commodities trade. It is 
sorted according to the origin and destination of commodities. Data come from China 
Statistical Yearbook, and are originally reported in US dollar. We use the annual average 
exchange rate to convert the data into RMB. 
Krugman specialization index. Following Krugman (1991), the degree of dissimilarity 
of production structure between two economies, say i and j, can be measured as: 
1
,                              
K
ij ik jk
k
Spec s s
=
= −∑  
where iks  ( jks ) represents the share of industry k in the economy of region i (j). By 
construction, Spec takes a minimum value of zero if region i has an industrial structure identical 
to region j, and takes a maximum value of 2 if it has no sectors in common with region j. 
    In this paper, the index is calculated to measure the specialization of provincial GDP 
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relative to national GDP. For the years of 1994-2004, the GDP is classified into eight one-digit 
industries: ‘Primary’, ‘Industry’, ‘Construction’, ‘Transport, Storage and Post, 
Telecommunications’, ‘Wholesale, Retail trade, and Catering services’, ‘Finance and Insurance’, 
‘Real estate’ and ‘Others’. For the years of 2005-2007, the GDP is classified into nine one-digit 
industries: ‘Primary’, ‘Industry’, ‘Construction’, ‘Transport, Storage and Post’, ‘Wholesale and 
Retail trades’, ‘Hotels and Catering services’, ‘Financial intermediation’, ‘Real estate’ and 
‘Others’. The source of China’s GDP data has been explained previously.   
Output gap. The variable refers to the cyclical component of the logarithm of actual 
GDP (constant 1978 yuan) around its trend obtained with the Hodrick-Prescott filter and a 
smoothing parameter (lambda) equal to 100.  
Personal income. The variable is composed of two parts: ‘disposable income of urban 
households’ and ‘net income of rural households’. According to China Statistical Yearbook, 
the former is obtained as:  
       -   -     sec
                                -        .
               
disposable income total household income income tax personal contribution to social urity
subsidy for keeping diaries for a sampled household
=
             
 
The latter is obtained as:  
      -     -    
                     -            -     .
net income total income taxes and fees paid household operation expenses
taxes and fees depreciation of fixed assets for production gifts to nonrural relatives
=
     
Provincial budgetary revenue, extra-budgetary revenue and net transfers from 
center. All data come from Finance Yearbook of China, various issues. In particular, the net 
transfers from center is calculated as ‘transfers from center’ less ‘local remittances to center’. 
Because the data on fiscal transfers in 1994 are missing, we follow Wang and Hu (2001) and 
take a broader measure of net transfers, which are supposed to equal the difference between 
the provincial budgetary expenditure and provincial budgetary revenue. 
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Urbanization rate. It’s defined as the ratio of urban population to the total population. 
The data come from China Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
 
Notes 
                                                        
*
 I am grateful to the participants of 2009 CERDI international conference on Chinese 
economy for their useful comments. I would also like to thank Kiril Tochkov for providing 
the data on central fiscal transfers. 
1
 As stressed Ma and Norregaard (1998), along with extra-budgetary funds, off-budgetary 
funds are another major source of local public finance in China. They are particularly 
collected by township and village governments without the authorization from higher levels 
of government. However, no official figures on off-budgetary funds are available. 
2
 The declining volatility of China’s output is also reported by Laurenceson and Dobson 
(2008), which rely on quarterly GDP data and different de-trending procedures. 
3
 Chongqing and Tibet are excluded from the sample due to lack of data. Readers are referred 
to Data appendix for further information on the dataset. 
4
 As argued in Fatás and Mihov (2001), the use of logarithm is justified on grounds of having 
non-linear relationship between government size and output volatility. However, we have 
not found significant difference in empirical results by using level data. 
5
 As usual, all the regressions in this paper include a constant term, which is not reported in 
the tables. 
6
 For instance, using a sample of Chinese provinces over 1980 to 1992, Zhang and Zou (1998) 
show that the economic growth rates are positively correlated with central government 
development spending, but negatively correlated with provincial counterparts. 
7
 By construction, the Krugman specialization index varying between 0 and 2 is positively 
 20 
                                                                                                                                                                             
correlated with the degree of production concentration. See Data appendix for the 
calculation formula. 
8
 Only the openness coefficient turns to be insignificant, but similar results are reported by 
many authors, such as Fatás and Mihov (2001), Andrés, Doménech and Fatás (2008), and 
Debrun, Pisani-Ferry and Sapir (2008). 
9
 As the space is limited, we have not shown the regression outcomes for the consolidated 
expenditure model, but the main results from various specifications are not significantly 
different from those for the decomposed expenditure model. 
10
 The fitness of the first stage of IV regression is rather high for the budgetary revenue and 
central transfers. The R-squared are 0.72 and 0.90 respectively. But the one for 
extra-budgetary revenue is relatively low, with R-squared equaling 0.24. 
11
 To have a sufficiently long time span, the output gap is first obtained from the data of the 
entire period of 1978-2007, and then we calculate the standard deviation for the years of 
1994-2007. 
12
 The growth rates of personal income and household consumption are deflated by 
Consumer Price Index. 
13
 Alternatively, we have also divided the sample into two sub-periods: 1994-2000 and 
2001-2007. The main findings on the insignificance of government size measures remain 
however unchanged. 
14
 As shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 4, because of the insignificance of random 
effects suggested by Breusch-Pagan test, the pooled OLS seems to be a preferred estimator 
for the income volatility model. 
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Table 1  
Economic Growth of Chinese Provinces over 1978-2007 
 Data source: China Statistical Yearbook, various issues 
Notes:  a. g: average annual growth rate of GDP, in constant price. 
       b. σ: standard deviation. 
Provinces g (%) 
 
(1978-2007) 
g (%) 
 
(1978-1993) 
g (%) 
 
(1994-2007) 
σ of g  
 
(1978-2007) 
σ of g 
  
(1978-1993) 
σ of g  
 
(1994-2007) 
Coefficient of 
variation 
(1978-2007) 
Coefficient of 
variation  
(1978-1993) 
Coefficient of 
variation  
(1994-2007) 
Beijing 10.58 9.64 11.66 3.47 4.35 1.45 0.33 0.45 0.12 
Tianjin 10.99 9.01 13.24 4.47 5.05 2.01 0.41 0.56 0.15 
Hebei 10.93 10.09 11.89 3.8 4.72 1.94 0.35 0.47 0.16 
Shanxi 10.44 9.33 11.71 4.62 5.78 2.15 0.44 0.62 0.18 
Neimeng 11.93 9.81 14.36 5.08 4.49 4.6 0.43 0.46 0.32 
Liaoning 9.61 8.94 10.38 4.15 5.19 2.23 0.43 0.58 0.21 
Jilin 10.2 9.57 10.91 4.67 5.92 2.37 0.46 0.62 0.22 
Heilongjiang 8.43 7.13 9.92 2.45 2.4 1.46 0.29 0.34 0.15 
Shanghai 10.49 8.92 12.29 3.53 4.01 1.52 0.34 0.45 0.12 
Jiangsu 13.15 13.25 13.03 5.02 6.59 2.08 0.38 0.50 0.16 
Zhejiang 13.62 13.94 13.26 5.08 6.47 2.7 0.37 0.46 0.20 
Anhui 10.22 9.26 11.31 5.16 6.6 2.23 0.50 0.71 0.20 
Fujian 13.01 13.39 12.57 4.49 5.46 2.96 0.35 0.41 0.24 
Jiangxi 10.19 9.98 10.44 3.36 4.03 2.35 0.33 0.40 0.23 
Shandong 12.06 11.41 12.81 3.75 4.65 2.12 0.31 0.41 0.17 
Henan 11.17 10.6 11.81 4.23 5.24 2.47 0.38 0.49 0.21 
Hubei 10.53 10.11 11.01 3.81 4.79 2.12 0.36 0.47 0.19 
Hunan 9.65 8.88 10.54 2.78 3.27 1.72 0.29 0.37 0.16 
Guangdong 13.45 13.61 13.27 4.61 5.83 2.56 0.34 0.43 0.19 
Guangxi 9.95 9.19 10.83 3.88 4.61 2.54 0.39 0.50 0.23 
Hainan 10.99 12.47 9.29 7.34 9.46 2.78 0.67 0.76 0.30 
Sichuan 9.98 9.25 10.81 2.8 3.21 1.94 0.28 0.35 0.18 
Guizhou 9.97 10.2 9.7 4.09 5.37 1.67 0.41 0.53 0.17 
Yunnan 10.17 10.51 9.78 3.7 4.72 1.9 0.36 0.45 0.19 
Shaanxi 10.49 9.77 11.32 3.78 4.87 1.47 0.36 0.50 0.13 
Gansu 9.68 8.89 10.59 4.25 5.62 1.05 0.44 0.63 0.10 
Qinghai 8.73 7.33 10.33 5.09 6.43 1.83 0.58 0.88 0.18 
Ningxia 9.53 8.83 10.33 3.28 4.11 1.6 0.34 0.47 0.15 
Xinjiang 10.36 11.11 9.51 2.5 2.77 1.83 0.24 0.25 0.19 
China 9.88 9.87 9.90 2.73 3.44 1.55 0.28 0.35 0.16 
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Table 2 
International Comparison on Variability of Growth Rate of Real GDP 
 Average annual growth rate 
of real GDP over 1978-2007 
(%) 
Standard 
deviation 
Coefficient of 
variation 
-Brazil  2.81 3.33 1.19 
-Canada 2.87 1.95 0.68 
-China 9.88 2.73 0.28 
-France 2.19 1.16 0.53 
-Germany 2.04 1.48 0.72 
-India 5.71 2.88 0.50 
-Italy 2.01 1.40 0.70 
-Japan 2.56 1.92 0.75 
-Russia 0.40 7.42 18.64 
-United Kingdom 2.44 1.67 0.69 
-United States 3.03 1.77 0.59 
 
   
-Low/middle income 
 (including China)  
4.18 1.75 0.42 
-Low/middle income 
(excluding China) 
3.32 1.69 0.51 
-OECD 2.71 1.11 0.41 
-World 3.05 1.06 0.35 
                Data source: World Development Indicators 2007, World Bank 
Notes:  a. For Russia: data available over 1990-2007.  
b. According to World Bank, low/middle income economies amount to all developing economies. 
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Table 3 
Output Volatility and Government Size : Cross-Section Estimations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS IV OLS IV OLS OLS 
Dependent variable sd_growth sd_growth sd_growth sd_growth sd_growth sd_gap sd_gap sd_in sd_con 
Exp_9407 -0.0063 
(0.0030)* 
- 0.0070   
(0.0046) 
- - - - - - 
Rev_b_9407 - -0.0065 
(0.0038) 
- 0.0048 
(0.0073) 
0.0112 
(0.0373) 
-0.0024 
(0.0130) 
-0.0336   
(0.0575) 
-0.0035   
(0.0291) 
0.0505 
(0.0291)* 
Rev_e_9407 - -0.0026 
(0.0092) 
- 0.0018 
(0.0043) 
0.0005 
(0.0108) 
0.0022 
(0.0076) 
0.0214   
(0.0190) 
0.0141   
(0.0156) 
0.0090   
(0.0178) 
Transfer_9407 - -0.0015 
(0.0018) 
- 0.0025 
(0.0021) 
0.0029 
(0.0040) 
-0.0023 
(0.0029) 
0.0023   
(0.0056) 
-0.0063   
(0.0063) 
0.0021   
(0.0054) 
Openness_9407 - - -0.0028   
(0.0027) 
-0.0031 
(0.0039) 
-0.0048 
(0.0160) 
0.0051 
(0.0070) 
0.0199   
(0.0248) 
-0.0079   
(0.0185) 
-0.0279   
(0.0205) 
Fin_dev_9407 - - -0.1828  
(0.0329)*** 
-0.1787 
(0.0426)*** 
-0.2037 
(0.1343)  
-0.3515 
(0.0811)*** 
-0.2495   
(0.1947) 
-0.0245   
(0.1347) 
-0.0285   
(0.1366) 
Spec_9407 - - 0.0256   
(0.0086)*** 
0.0242 
(0.0100)** 
0.0210 
(0.0182) 
0.0487 
(0.0196)*** 
0.0663  
(0.0385)* 
-0.0196   
(0.0314) 
-0.0445    
(0.0306) 
Growth_9407 - - 0.4522   
(0.1253)*** 
0.4645 
(0.1314)*** 
0.5015 
(0.1607)*** 
0.3273 
(0.1462)** 
0.3161   
(0.3089) 
0.1525   
(0.2790) 
0.3766   
(0.2226)* 
 
         
R-Squared 0.0609 0.0699 0.6262 0.6288 0.6127 0.6771 0.5310 0.2099 0.3018 
P-value for F test - 0.1744  - 0.4626 0.2883 0.7894 0.6807 0.3876 0.2120 
P-value for  
Sargan test  
- - - - 0.7903 - 0.2723 - - 
 
         
Nb. Observations 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Notes: a. Huber-White robust Standard errors are in parentheses, with *** Significance at the 1% level; 
** Significance at the 5% level; and * Significance at the 10% level. 
      b. F test for the joint significance of three government size measures: Rev_b_9407, Rev_e_9407 and 
Transfer_9407.  
 
 
 
 27 
Table 4  
Output Volatility and Government Size : Panel Estimations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation method Random effects Random effects  Random effects Pooled OLS Random effects 
Dependent variable sd_growth sd_gap sd_income sd_income sd_con 
Revenue_b -0.0002   
(0.0051) 
-0.0008   
(0.0061) 
0.0065   
(0.0212) 
0.0064   
(0.0212) 
0.0300   
(0.0206) 
Revenue_e 0.0055   
(0.0041) 
-0.0012    
(0.0038) 
0.0284   
(0.0157)* 
0.0285   
(0.0157)* 
0.0209   
(0.0133) 
Transfer 0.0017   
(0.0016) 
-0.0017   
(0.0021) 
-0.0083   
(0.0071) 
-0.0083  
(0.0071) 
0.0001   
(0.0052) 
Openness 0.0038   
(0.0041) 
0.0006    
(0.0047) 
0.0024   
(0.0159) 
0.0025   
(0.0159) 
-0.0139   
(0.0105) 
Fin_dev -0.0951   
(0.0422)** 
-0.1864   
(0.0797)** 
0.1172   
(0.1112) 
0.1170   
(0.1110) 
0.0234   
(0.1630) 
Spec 0.0172   
(0.0091)* 
0.0252   
(0.0199) 
-0.0367   
(0.0268) 
-0.0366  
(0.0268) 
-0.0504   
(0.0352) 
Growth 0.2466   
(0.0583)*** 
0.0453    
(0.1226) 
-0.0771   
(0.1640) 
-0.0769   
(0.1639) 
0.2088   
(0.1759) 
Period_1999-2003 -0.0049 
(0.0022)** 
-0.0042 
(0.0034) 
-0.0592   
(0.0058)*** 
-0.0592   
(0.0058)*** 
-0.0086   
(0.0065) 
Period_2004-2007 -0.0159 
(0.0031)*** 
0.0003 
(0.0039) 
-0.0203  
(0.0137) 
-0.0204   
(0.0137) 
-0.0150   
(0.0091)* 
 
     
R-Squared 0.5865 0.6476 0.2368 0.5249 0.1691 
P-value for Hausman 
test  
0.8370 0.4967 0.2054 - 0.8798 
P-value for Breusch 
Pagan test 
0.0995 0.0655 0.4624 - 0.0939 
P-value for F test 0.2644 0.7890 0.2417 0.2496 0.1314 
 
     
Nb. Observations 87 87 87 87 87 
Notes: a. Huber-White robust Standard errors are in parentheses, with *** Significance at the 1% level; 
** Significance at the 5% level; and * Significance at the 10% level. 
b. Between R-Squared for the random-effects estimations. 
c. F test for the joint significance of three government size measures: Revenue_b, Revenue_e 
and Transfer. 
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Figure 1  
Budgetary Revenue Size Relative to GDP 
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Data source: Finance Yearbook of China, various issues 
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Figure 2  
Trends in Provincial Government Size 
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Data source: Finance Yearbook of China, various issues 
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Figure 3  
Trends in Net Fiscal Transfers 
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
Net transfer/ Provincial expenditure
Net transfer / GDP
 
Data source: Finance Yearbook of China, various issues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 31 
Figure 4 Size of Extra-budgetary Funds Relative to GDP 
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Data source: Finance Yearbook of China, various issues 
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Figure 5  
China’s Real GDP Growth and Its Volatility during 1978-2007 
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                   Data source: China Statistical Yearbook, various issues 
 
